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Background 
Recent acts of international terrorism, the increased frequency of extreme 
weather events and newly emerging health threats highlight the need to develop 
effective emergency response plans and capabilities for responding to all types of 
disasters. Many countries recognize the importance to consider emergency 
preparedness as the key health planning activity. Since the September 11th, 2001 
terrorist attacks, and the devastation of Hurricanes Rita and Katrina, the United States 
have extensively reinforced hospital disaster preparedness and response.  
Although since the major disasters, hospitals have implemented and 
continuously tested their emergency operation plans, recent studies reported 
existing confusion over roles and responsibilities, poor communication, lack of 
planning, suboptimal training, and a lack of hospital integration into community 
disaster planning. Therefore, it is important that further studies are conducted in 
order to capitalize on lessons learned from previous real-incidents and emergency 
response exercises.  
Many hospitals conduct exercises every year, and they conclude the process 
with an After-Action Report and Improvement Plan.  Therefore, there are thousands 
of AAR/IP’s across the country with limited opportunity to compare them or to learn 
from them collectively. Our project has gathered Improvement Plans (IP’s) and 
conducted a qualitative analysis which determined whether the “lessons learned” can 
be categorized into common themes.   
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Introduction 
Since the terrorist attacks of September 2001, anthrax attacks, Hurricane 
Katrina of August 2005, and the flu vaccine shortage of 2004-2005, the United States 
(US) has considerably strengthened its public health emergency preparedness 
(PHEP) (Seid et al., 2007). To effectively respond to the dramatic increase in the 
frequency and intensity of natural disasters (Yu, Zhong, Pei, Bian, & Heilman, 2016), 
infectious disease, technological, and human-caused disasters, multiple   resources 
were allocated and directed to enhance U.S. public health system and address gaps in 
emergency preparedness operations (Der-Martirosian et al., 2017). However, the 
experience of the 2017 Hurricane Harvey showed that disasters continue to cause 
loss of human life, environmental damage, disruption of infrastructure, and economic 
loss. At the same time, terrorists are using new technologies and militarized tactics to 
cause maximum terror among unprotected civilians (Bobko et al., 2018). Therefore, 
concerns remain about the ability of the public health system to promptly and 
effectively respond to disasters (Seid et al., 2007). Studies of previous disasters have 
documented that hospitals located in disaster areas are not well prepared and most 
of the time experience poor emergency response performance due to functional 
collapse (Nekoie-Moghadam et al., 2016). Preparing hospitals for disasters has 
become a national security priority (Toner, 2017). Therefore, hospitals should 
implement actions, programs, and systems that improve their capabilities and 
capacities to provide essential healthcare while minimizing the negative effects of the 
disaster (Djalali et al., 2014).  
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As an important component of the public health preparedness system, 
hospitals require a continuous process of planning and exercising while measuring 
performance through indicators and metrics, and implementing and testing 
improvements (Jenkins, Kelen, Sauer, Fredericksen, & McCarthy, 2009; Shine, Hill, 
Pope, & Altevogt, 2008). Hospital surge capacity is based on the hospital’s ability to 
meet a sudden and unusual spike in demand for resources (Waxman et al., 2017). 
Maintaining high-level emergency preparedness for hospitals is challenging as the 
process requires resources that many hospitals may lack (Adini, Laor, Hornik-Lurie, 
Schwartz, & Aharonson-Daniel, 2012). A multitude of intractable disasters tests the 
ability of hospitals to effectively manage emergencies situations. Confusion over roles 
and responsibilities, poor communication, lack of planning, suboptimal training, and 
lack of hospital integration into community disaster planning can lead to poor 
readiness (Nekoie-Moghadam et al., 2016). There is a significant urgent need for 
reliable and valid methods to measure hospital preparedness capabilities in order to 
ensure their resiliency, continuity, and rapid recovery (Der-Martirosian et al., 2017). 
Valid and standardized assessment tools are required to evaluate the correlation 
between the level of preparedness and the efficacy of response performance (Djalali 
et al., 2014).  
Effective management of disaster operations will improve readiness, decrease 
response time, and facilitate recovery (Altay & Green III, 2006). Planning and training 
for disasters will reduce both human and property loss, and improve the rapid 
recovery from the disaster (Singleton, DeBastiani, Rose, & Kahn, 2014). However, 
planning and training might not be sufficient if valuable lessons learned from 
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disasters and exercises are not used to anticipate response challenges (der Heide, 
2006). The World Association of Disaster Medicine has highlighted the need for a 
more scientific approach to all aspects of disaster medicine and has noted the lack of 
standardized methods to assess mass casualty incident responses (Ingrassia et al., 
2010). In the United States, the Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) has evolved in 
developing core capabilities to support hospital emergency readiness (Morris, 2016; 
Toner, 2017; Waxman et al., 2017). 
The National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), which has existed since the 
Cold War, is designated as the primary federal response mechanism for mass casualty 
situations (Toner, 2017). Originally designed to respond to large numbers of military 
casualties from foreign battlefields, the NDMS’s mission has evolved toward civilian 
medical support (Franco, Toner, Waldhorn, Inglesby, & O'Toole, 2007). Due to 
increasingly frequent terrorist activities, the Metropolitan Medical Response 
Program (MMRP) was created at the Health and Human Services (HHS) (Toner, 
2017). The MMRP was eventually transferred to the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) until the program became defunded in 2011 (Toner, 2017; Waxman 
et al., 2017). At the Hospital level, much stricter Joint Commission standards for 
emergency preparedness were released in early 2001(Morris, 2016). But the 
September 2001 terrorist attacks led to major transformation regarding the Joint 
Commission standards due to the creation of the Office of Public Health Preparedness  
(Toner, 2017).  
The new office created the National Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness 
Program (NBHPP) whose mission was to prepare the country’s 5,000 hospitals for 
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expected bio-attacks (Franco et al., 2007). In 2006, the Pandemic and All-Hazards 
Preparedness Act (PAHPA) was signed, replacing the Office of Public Health 
Preparedness with the new Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and 
Response (ASPR) (Morris, 2016; Toner, 2017). After the creation of ASPR, the NBHPP 
was changed to the Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP), whose mission involves 
all-hazard healthcare preparedness (Toner, 2017). The HPP has continued to evolve 
and has increasingly focused on the development of healthcare coalitions (HCC) 
designed to increase emergency preparedness collaboration among hospitals and 
between hospitals and public health agencies, emergency management agencies, and 
emergency medical services (Toner, 2017). In parallel with the HPP, in 2002, the 
Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) launched the Public Health 
Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) cooperative agreement to effectively prepare 
territorial, tribal, local, and state public health departments (Toner, 2017). On the 
other hand, the Joint Commission has continued to evolve by ensuring that health 
professions are committed to a high quality of patient care. 
The frequency and magnitude of medical errors and deadly disaster in the US 
have increased awareness about the need for effective medical processes and 
emergency preparedness responses (Devkaran & O’Farrell, 2015). Therefore, the 
Joint Commission has developed Emergency Management (EM) processes to allow 
hospitals to plan to respond to the effects of potential emergency events that could 
disrupt normal healthcare capabilities (Joint Commission, 2014). To effectively 
respond to an emergency, the JCAH has developed six critical areas that hospitals can 
consider to address a range of incidents (Joint Commission, 2014).  
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Although numerous planners and responders have documented lessons 
learned during emergency responses (Djalali et al., 2014), the review of the literature 
highlighted that many challenges experienced during planning and real-events seem 
to repeat themselves disaster after disaster (der Heide, 2006). There is a lack of 
standards for defining and measuring preparedness, and for effectively incorporating 
lessons learned from past experience and implementing systematic changes (Nekoie-
Moghadam et al., 2016; Seid et al., 2007). Whether from real events or simulations, 
public health and healthcare organizations recognized the need to use a lessons-
learned approach to identify and disseminate the experience gained over time 
(Savoia, Agboola, & Biddinger, 2012). It is important that lessons learned are 
transferred from individuals directly involved in emergency operations to systematic 
changes within the entire organization (Seid et al., 2007). An objective method for 
assessment should determine strengths and weaknesses in the disaster response and 
provide information that could ultimately lead to improvements in the response 
system (Ingrassia et al., 2010). Systematically collected data from disasters or 
fictional exercises might help emergency planners to avoid common disaster 
response pitfalls (der Heide, 2006). Therefore, it is useful for emergency 
preparedness planners to implement formal tools for identifying, documenting and 
disseminating corrective actions before a response to disasters and simulations. 
After-Action Reports (ARRs)/Improvement Plan (IP) guidelines are designed 
to document the exercise planning, execution, and analysis that have become the 
implementation requirements for the Department of Homeland Security’ State 
Homeland Security Grant Program, the Department of Health and Human Services, 
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the Center for Disease Control and Prevention’s Public Health Emergency 
Preparedness Grant Program, and the Urban Area Security Initiative (Singleton et al., 
2014). The use of AAR templates became strongly recommended in several federal 
funding agencies’ capability and exercise guidance. Therefore, the Homeland Security 
Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR/IP template is considered the 
primary tool of the National Exercise Program materials and improvement process 
(Norige, Yenson, Elkin, Mapar, & Legary, 2012; Singleton et al., 2014). 
The HSEEP provides a set of guidelines and principles for exercise programs 
to effectively manage preparedness simulations, design and develops exercises, 
evaluate outcomes, and improve planning (Norige et al., 2012). The Joint Commission 
requires healthcare institutions to conduct and maintain emergency operations plan, 
and to conduct exercises and drills at least twice a year (Ferrer, Ramirez, Sauser, 
Iverson, & Upperman, 2009). Exercises and drills are key components of national 
preparedness as they provide the opportunity to shape planning, assess and validate 
capabilities, and address areas for improvement (Norige et al., 2012). Preparedness 
exercises play a vital role in national preparedness by allowing whole community 
stakeholders to test and validate plans and capabilities. Exercises enable the 
identification of both capability gaps and areas for improvement in order to 
strengthen whole community efforts to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, 
and recover from all disasters (Norige et al., 2012). The National Exercise Program 
(NEP) is consistent with the HSEEP methodology because in that it provides tools and 
guidelines that are flexible, scalable, and adaptable to all mission areas (such as 
prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery) (Norige et al., 2012). The 
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HSEEP methodology is based on an exercise cycle which involves design and 
development, conduct, evaluation, and improvement planning (Norige et al., 2012). 
Immediately after the conduct of the exercises, a “hot wash” session provides an 
opportunity to discuss strengths and areas for improvement (Norige et al., 2012). 
Information collected during Hot Wash, the debriefing, and completed participant 
feedback forms can be used to generate the AAR/IP to ensure future exercise 
improvements (Norige et al., 2012).  
The HSEEP developed the After-Action Report/Improvement Plan (AAR/IP) 
to provide a template and guidance to evaluate exercise objectives and capabilities 
(Norige et al., 2012). Preparedness exercises test the knowledge, skills, and abilities 
that are likely to be needed during emergency situations (Ingrassia et al., 2010). 
AAR/IP is used to document strengths, areas for improvement, core capability 
performance, and corrective actions (Norige et al., 2012). They summarize key 
information related to the evaluation of the exercises and their length, format, and 
development timeframe depend on the exercise type and scope. AARs are emergency 
preparedness tools for collecting and documenting evaluations of key processes 
during the response to both simulations and real emergency situations (Savoia et al., 
2012). The HSEEP AAR/IP templates are the standards for reporting preparedness 
exercises, real incidents, and continuous quality improvement across various federal 
agencies on disaster management (Singleton et al., 2014). AARs are routinely 
generated after drills or exercises to assess improvements (Seid et al., 2007).  In fact, 
formal AARs are now required by public health and healthcare agencies and 
organizations such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the 
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Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR), and the Joint Commission 
(Morris, 2016; Savoia et al., 2012; Waxman et al., 2017). The AAR templates are 
intended to assist in identifying lessons learned from disaster preparedness exercises 
in order to facilitate the quality improvement of the response process (Norige et al., 
2012; Singleton et al., 2014). They contain basic information, such as the exercise 
name, the type of exercise, dates, location, participating organizations, mission areas, 
specific threat or hazard, a brief scenario description, and the name of the exercise 
sponsor (Mast et al., 2016; Norige et al., 2012).  
The main focus of the AARs is the analysis of core capabilities which involves 
the collection of sufficient relevant data to support effective evaluation and 
improvement planning (Mast et al., 2016; Norige et al., 2012). Hospital emergency 
preparedness planning is done based on core capabilities that are listed in the HPP 
(Toner, 2017). The AARs should provide an overview of performance related to each 
exercise objective and associated core capability while highlighting strengths, as well 
as areas for improvement (Norige et al., 2012). Areas for improvement requiring 
corrective actions are those that will continue to seriously impede capability 
performance if left unresolved. It is important to provide useful information as to how 
quality improvement aspects are built into AARs to better implement corrective 
actions. After the identification of strengths and areas for improvement that directly 
addresses core capability gaps, improvement planning should be done to implement 
concrete corrective actions (Norige et al., 2012).  
Improvement planning is the final phase of the preparedness exercise as it 
involves the qualitative assessment of actionable recommendations that are intended 
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to resolve capability gaps and issues identified during the exercises or real-world 
disasters (Norige et al., 2012). Corrective actions documented in the AAR/IP should 
be monitored and continually reported until fully completed (Norige et al., 2012). 
However, most of the time lessons learned embodied in AARs are not acted on and sit 
on shelves due to unclear expectations and measures (Seid et al., 2007). 
Hospitals play a major role in emergency response because a disaster can 
create medical needs that are beyond their normal capabilities. They are an important 
link in the chain of disaster response (Nekoie-Moghadam et al., 2016). There is a need 
to improve hospital preparedness that addresses a full range of potential disasters 
(Jenkins et al., 2009). Achieving and maintaining a high level of emergency 
preparedness is very challenging for hospitals because of the complex role they play 
during disaster response (Der-Martirosian et al., 2017). It is equally challenging to  
evaluate hospital emergency readiness to effectively respond during disasters (Der-
Martirosian et al., 2017). Evaluation and reporting tools should be included in 
hospital disaster plans in order to recognize potential gaps and weaknesses (Nekoie-
Moghadam et al., 2016). AARs in hospitals are a fundamental part of emergency 
preparedness and quality improvement (Brunner et al., 2014). For instance, during 
the April 2013 Boston Marathon attack, the Brigham and Women's Hospital (BWH) 
called for a substantial volume of radiological imaging, taxing their capacity to 
perform such studies (Tobert, von Keudell, & Rodriguez, 2015). Due to the severity of 
physical injuries, the BWH AAR revealed that greater use of computerized 
tomography (CT) scans should have been anticipated in the disaster planning 
(Brunner et al., 2014). Another example included a tabletop exercise that 
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acknowledged that adult patient hospitals are lacking pediatric supply caches (Ferrer 
et al., 2009). Other important ethical issues were raised regarding whether or not 
adult general surgeons were allowed to operate on pediatric patients during 
emergency situations (Ferrer et al., 2009).   
Statement of the Problem 
In recent years, communities throughout the United States and other countries 
have experienced large-scale disasters that challenged the capacity of response 
(Ferrer et al., 2009). Despite multiple attempts to document and learn from previous 
emergency responses and scenario-based exercises, the challenges experienced in 
planning and responding to disasters seem to be persistent (der Heide, 2006; Savoia 
et al., 2012). Improvement areas keep repeating themselves in AARs because 
corrective actions are not implemented due to unclear expectations and measures. 
Lessons learned embodied in the improvement matrix are not acted on and sit on 
shelves due to unclear expectations and measures (Seid et al., 2007). For instance, 
although many hospital’s improvement areas keep mentioning the need for effective 
communication, poor communication systems remain a common concern in disaster 
preparedness efforts (Ferrer et al., 2009). Systems-level learning remains challenging 
to accomplish, therefore, review of incidents and the identification of lessons should 
be more readily performed (Savoia et al., 2012). Nationally aggregated pools of AARs 
should be used to collect the most common response challenges that hospitals are 
experiencing routinely and proven problematic (Savoia, Agboola, & Biddinger, 2012). 
Accordingly, emergency preparedness and response planners can use data collected 
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when drafting their training programs, so that the challenges could be included, and 
hopefully not occur again.  
This project will endeavor to perform a qualitative review of hospital AARs in 
order to catalog the most common corrective actions identified during real-incidents 
or simulations. The project also strives to identify the link between the improvement 
efforts and the core capabilities to maximize knowledge management and quality 
improvement practices. With our results, we will attempt to identify most common 
improvement efforts which can be translated into concrete actions to be incorporated 
into the design of future emergency preparedness planning and training. 
Significance of study 
Preparing hospitals for disasters has become a national security priority 
because the US has experienced large-scale emergencies that caused the death of 
large numbers of people (Toner, 2017). Despite a large amount of approximately 
$300 million spent yearly in hospital emergency preparedness program (Lindsay, 
2017), hospital’s preparedness improvement areas continue to repeatedly document 
common pitfalls in their AARs (Waxman et al., 2017). It is important that educational 
and training programs focus on common concerns in disaster preparedness efforts as 
well as challenges that were experienced during actual disaster responses. Thus, 
funding could be directed to assist in solving the common problems which may save 
lives and money or at least generate a better return on investment in the long term.  
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i. Purpose of the study  
1. Research question 
What are the most common areas for improvements identified during 
preparedness exercises or real disaster responses, as reported by a national sample 
of U.S. hospitals? 
2. Specific Aims 
To identify common themes in a sample of Improvement Matrices from US 
hospitals in order to categorize the correctives actions.  
3. Definitions of terms 
We believed that it is important to define certain terms used in our study to 
ensure common understanding. Therefore, we have attempted to define the following 
terms: 
- The term “code” is often considered to be a system of words, letters, 
figures, or other symbols substituted for other word, letters, etc., especially 
for the purpose of secrecy. In our study the term “code” refers to an 
analytical process in which data are categorized to facilitate analysis; 
- The term "segment" is often associated with parts into which something is 
or may be divided. Our study has associated "segment" to a portion of 
statement that has been coded; 
- The terms “elements of performance” generally mean work assignments 
or responsibilities that are used to plan, monitor, and appraise 
performance. Our study has used the terms “elements of performance” to 
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categorize the components of the critical areas by which hospital 
emergency response capabilities can be planned, monitored, and rated; 
- The verb “extrapolate” refers to the extension of an application to an 
unknown situation by assuming that existing trends will continue, or 
similar methods will be applicable. Our study has used the verb 
"extrapolate" to link coded segment to its assumed corresponding 
elements of a performance.   
4. Assumptions 
The major assumption of the study considered that hospital emergency 
response readiness does not depend on the size of the hospital. Therefore, the size of 
hospitals was not controlled during the analysis. Another assumption was made that 
the sample was a representative of the full scope of threats as data were randomly 
collected.  
2. Literature Review  
The increasing human and economic impact of disasters, the globalization of the 
terrorist activities, and the declaration of the 1990s as the International Decade of 
Natural Disaster Reduction are among the reasons for the rise in interest in 
emergency management (Altay & Green III, 2006). Healthcare systems should 
prepare effective emergency response models to cope with mass-casualty incidents 
(Adini et al., 2006). Disaster management involves two stages; pre-event and post-
event. Pre-event efforts include predicting and analyzing potential risks and 
developing strategies for mitigation, while post-event tasks begin during the 
emergency (Altay & Green III, 2006. Since 2002, the need for pre-event preparedness 
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has been reinforced by the HSEEP and underlying issues or root causes should be 
uncovered to develop corrective and actionable solutions to improvement areas 
(Singleton et al., 2014). Effective emergency management efforts should involve both 
pre-event and post-event data to locate, allocate, coordinate, and manage available 
resources (Altay & Green III, 2006).  For years, hospital emergency management 
services have used various modes to collect and disseminate lessons-learned from 
exercise or real emergency responses (Djalali et al., 2014; Savoia et al., 2012). 
Specifically, over the past decade, numerous initiatives and preparedness tools have 
been developed to help hospitals improve their ability to become better prepared for 
major disasters (Der-Martirosian et al., 2017).  
To date, there is limited agreement about indicators that constitute effective 
hospital emergency preparedness (Adini et al., 2006; Ingrassia et al., 2010; Nekoie-
Moghadam et al., 2016) and no largely-accepted, validated instruments to measure 
readiness exist (Adini et al., 2006; Adini et al., 2012; Der-Martirosian et al., 2017; 
McCarthy, Brewster, Hsu, Macintyre, & Kelen, 2009). Furthermore, there are a 
number of differences in the protocols and tools that exist for evaluating hospital’s 
emergency management capabilities (Jenkins et al., 2009; McCarthy et al., 2009; 
Nekoie-Moghadam et al., 2016). The Hospital Safety Index (HSI) developed by the 
World Health Organization (WHO) is one of the internationally-accepted and 
standardized evaluation methods (Djalali et al., 2014). While a number of instruments 
are hazard-specific, some tools are more comprehensive with the ability to be used to 
measure hospital all-hazards preparedness (Der-Martirosian et al., 2017). Hospital 
preparedness evaluations also may include drills and functional exercises to assess 
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performance during a simulated mass-casualty emergency (MCE) (Ingrassia et al., 
2010). In the process of building resilient medical systems under the leadership of 
the HHS Emergency Support Function 8 (ESF8), healthcare coalitions have been 
established (Lowe, Hansen, Sanger, & Obaid, 2016). For instance, due to key 
leadership gaps identified in a hospital decision-making capacity, community-wide 
healthcare coalition-based exercises are being more and more commonly 
recommended (Lowe et al., 2016). The aim of hospitals is to be prepared to effectively 
respond to disasters and other potential disruptions to health care service delivery. 
Based on the National Health Security Strategy (NHSS), the HPP core capabilities were 
strengthened to improve hospital readiness (Rose, Murthy, Brooks, & Bryant, 2017). 
In 2012, the National guidance established 10 HPP core capabilities aligned with the 
15 PHEP capabilities (Lowe et al., 2016). Based on the 2012 national guidance, the 
ASPR developed the 2017-2022 Health Care Preparedness and Response Capabilities 
guidance which outlined four core capabilities (Veenema, 2018). One of the 
conditions for hospitals to access federal grants is to fully engage themselves in 
emergency preparedness operations (Barnes, 2017). In 1965, financial incentive 
approach created by US government is the establishment of the ‘deemed status’ by 
which any hospital accredited by the Joint Commission would be deemed to be 
eligible for the Medicare program  (Schyve, 2000). Medicare program represents a 
large portion of the hospital income and that can contribute in financing emergency 
preparedness programs.  
The story of the Joint Commission started in 1910 and its development has 
increased with technological progress in the practice of medicine to offer 
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considerably safer care for patients (Roberts, Coale, & Redman, 1987). The Joint 
Commission accredits over 20,000 ambulatory care, behavioral health care, home 
care, long-term care organizations, hospitals, laboratories, and health care networks 
(Roaten, Johnson, Genzel, Khan, & North, 2018). Over 96% of hospital beds in the US 
are in accredited hospitals (Schyve, 2000).  The Joint Commission created an Office of 
Quality Monitoring to effectively handle quality-related issues (Schyve, 2000). To 
specifically manage an emergency in hospitals, the Joint Commission introduced the 
six critical areas: communication, resources and assets, safety and security, staff 
responsibilities, patient clinical and support activities, and utilities (Joint 
Commission, 2014). Hospitals are encouraged to consider their capabilities in these 
critical areas in order to improve their emergency response efforts. Therefore, 
hospitals have started using AARs to summarize lessons learned or recommendations 
made to improve outcomes (Ross et al., 2008).  
Although several disparate forms of debriefing methodologies were used, the 
AARs were originally developed by the U.S. Army before becoming widely adopted by 
non-military private institutions, and healthcare organizations (Savoia et al., 2012). 
The Military AARs were used to provide feedback on the accomplishment of exercises, 
deployments, or other military operations (Ross et al., 2008). Although the original 
purpose of HSEEP AAR template was used to better identify and derive critical lessons 
from preparedness exercises, it is also used to facilitate continuous quality 
improvement for real disaster reporting (Singleton et al., 2014).  
The use of the HSEEP AAR template by all public health services allowed 
comparisons across jurisdictions for a better understanding of the range of 
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jurisdictional capabilities (Singleton et al., 2014). The HSEEP AAR guidelines provide 
reporting equivalent measures by recommending the use of consistent standards that 
can be applied to public health services. The HSEEP AAR format created a common 
approach to exercise preparedness plans while evaluating improvement needs within 
the emergency preparedness and response communities (Norige et al., 2012; 
Singleton et al., 2014). Improvement planning involves tracking the implementation 
of corrective actions to ensure tangible preparedness improvements (Norige et al., 
2012). The HSEEP AAR was developed to ensure that a sufficient level of detail 
needed to improve preparedness capabilities are well reported (Singleton et al., 
2014). AARs provide a reservoir of vital information to prepare public health services 
to effectively perform in a contingency environment (Ross et al., 2008). Yet, despite 
the large dissemination of the ARRs, variability and variety of healthcare, and public 
health systems may increase the risk of failure to fully implement the corrective 
actions (Savoia et al., 2012).  
One major challenge was the fact that most operational data collection on disaster 
medical planning was done on sudden, single impact events such as explosions, 
tornadoes, or flash floods, and in such conditions, the location of the research could 
not be selected (der Heide, 2006). The unexpected nature of disasters obliged the data 
to be collected retrospectively, which leads to challenges in the comparison of pre-
disasters and post-disasters (der Heide, 2006). Previous literature reported various 
challenges in the after-action reporting process regarding the involvement of 
healthcare professionals as not everyone has the opportunity to be involved in the 
after-action review (Ross et al., 2008). Traditionally, the written AAR did not provide 
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an adequate feedback loop, therefore the alternative process involved the use of hot 
wash meetings, online submissions, e-mail contributions, and verbal debriefings 
(Ross et al., 2008). 
As early as 1988, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) recognized that the public health 
system is a complex network of individuals and institutions (Curry, 2005; Savoia et 
al., 2012). The multiplicity of stakeholders involved in the emergency preparedness 
management effort can be challenging to coordinate and that significantly impact the 
type and quality of response efforts (Seid et al., 2007). In addition to the complexity 
of the public health system, disaster preparedness is challenging due to the 
uniqueness of events, the frequent changes of the environment, and the lack of 
standardized processes (Seid et al., 2007). Therefore, it can be challenging for public 
health services to work together to achieve the goal of keeping people secure and 
healthy (Savoia et al., 2012). To avoid recurring challenges during emergency 
response, it was important for health institutions to produce generalized 
recommendations that can be useful in all types of disasters (Altay & Green III, 2006; 
Savoia et al., 2012). The improvement effort involved the effective connection 
between the observations of difficulties and the implementation of corrective actions 
(Savoia et al., 2012; Seid et al., 2007).  
The medical emergency planners should address the response problems 
identified in descriptive disaster studies in order to assess the impact of 
preparedness and response measures on morbidity and mortality (der Heide, 2006). 
Therefore, the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Homeland Security 
Exercise Evaluation Program (HSEEP) requires organizations to link lessons learned 
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to the planned implementation of improvement efforts (Savoia et al., 2012). AARs 
were designed to accommodate both discussion-based and operations-based 
exercises as reflected in the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (Norige et al., 
2012; Singleton et al., 2014). For instance, during the 2009 Influenza (HINI) pandemic 
response, all recipients of federal funds were required to use the HSEEP AAR template 
and guidelines to document their emergency response (Singleton et al., 2014).  
The HSEEP guidelines recommended that exercises and drills are performed to 
test the improvements that are identified in AAR in response to the challenges (Savoia 
et al., 2012). The AARs which are the final written documents of the after action 
reviews will be used as quality improvement instruments (Singleton et al., 2014). In 
addition, AARs data is updated to contain the most representative, recent, and most 
common response difficulties (Savoia et al., 2012). It is important to implement 
structures and rigorous information reviews of post-event in order to appropriately 
make system-wide changes (Szoenyi, Venkateswaran, Keating, & MacClune, 2017). 
For instance, lessons learned from December 2015, terrorist attack in Southern 
California has considerably shown that there is a distinct difference between a 
qualified Police Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) paramedic and a paramedic 
responding as part of the rescue task force (RTF)(Bobko et al., 2018). SWAT 
paramedics are trained to operate in unsafe zones whereas the EMS personnel are 
not most of the time trained to provide care under a direct threat (Bobko et al., 2018). 
Confusion of operational objectives during an emergency response can impact the 
performance of both Emergency Medical Services (EMS) and their law enforcement 
partners (Bobko et al., 2018). During an emergency response, hospital staff may 
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encounter challenges regarding altered standards of care (Ferrer et al., 2009). 
Another example is that, after the 2014-2016 West Africa Ebola response, hospitals 
in many countries used their AARs to identify gaps in operational interventions in the 
US(Hurtado, Meyer, Snyder, & Nuzzo, 2018). Some studies suggested the use of 
Quality Improvement (QI) methods to improve the performance and outcomes of 
public health systems during emergency preparedness and response (Seid et al., 
2007).  
QI involves an ongoing multidisciplinary, systems-focused, data-driven method of 
understanding and improving the efficiency, effectiveness, and reliability of public 
health practices and processes related to emergency preparedness (Seid et al., 2007; 
Szoenyi et al., 2017). QI is a pervasive philosophy to ensure that information about 
past performance should be used to improve the quality of response (Ross et al., 
2008). The preparedness process should involve building response capabilities 
which involve informing, educating, and empowering people while setting goals and 
measurements to evaluate performance (Seid et al., 2007). Public health 
organizations should be accountable for implementing the QI methods to identify 
corrective actions of the AARs (Seid et al., 2007). Since 2005, Root Cause Analysis 
(RCA) has been an integral component of AARs for more effective analysis of 
emergency preparedness issues (Singleton et al., 2014).  
RCA is a qualitative, retrospective, quality improvement tool used to understand 
the source of the problem down to the lowest level of the process (Percarpio, Watts, 
& Weeks, 2008; Singleton et al., 2014; Woodward, 2004). During the after action 
review, RCA is used to analyze identified issues in order to document successful or 
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promising practices (Singleton et al., 2014). It can provide an appropriate level of 
needed insight into disaster response successes and challenges (Norige et al., 2012; 
Singleton et al., 2014). Identifying deficit-based factors will identify changes to be 
made to prevent the recurrence of problems that were already highlighted (Singleton 
et al., 2014). Changes will involve corrective actions that contain sufficient detail to 
be implemented and must be intended to correct the root cause of the issue (Rooney 
& Heuvel, 2004; Singleton et al., 2014). The HSEEP guidelines involve continuous 
improvement system through the effective implementation of corrective actions 
(Norige et al., 2012; Singleton et al., 2014). The corrective actions should be specific 
in containing enough useful information to clearly state what steps should be taken 
to effectively address the issue (Singleton et al., 2014; Szoenyi et al., 2017). By 
including the reason, purpose, or benefit of implementing the corrective actions, 
improvement recommendations must clearly indicate measurable key performance 
indicators to gauge progress toward full implementation (Norige et al., 2012; 
Percarpio et al., 2008; Rooney & Heuvel, 2004; Singleton et al., 2014; Woodward, 
2004).  AARs that include RCA, as well as corrective actions associated with quality 
improvement of capabilities will increase the effectiveness in the emergency 
preparedness efforts. 
The aim of this project is to contribute to the maximization of knowledge 
management and quality improvement practices in hospitals emergency response 
efforts. Therefore, we have endeavored to analyze improvement plans in order to 
identify common challenges from real events disasters and emergency preparedness 
and response exercises.  Our study has attempted to describe how hospitals can 
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mitigate these issues, by suggesting that recurring response challenges are integrated 
into the design of future emergency operations planning.  
3. Methodology 
i. Sample population:  
Improvement plans will be collected from a convenience sample of 
approximately 30-50 hospitals, which are actives members of the Association of 
Healthcare Emergency Preparedness Professionals (AHEPP). The AHEPP was formed 
in 2014 to provide healthcare preparedness professionals with the best range of 
strategic, educational, operational, networking, and planning resources. The requests 
to participate in the study were sent to hospitals with no regards to their size and 
specialties. The assumption was made that the sample was a representative of the full 
scope of threats as requests were randomly sent to hospitals that participated to the 
AHEPP Annual Conference in 2017.  We preferred to address hospitals that were 
members of the AHEPP as we could experience some reticence from hospitals in 
sharing their confidential documents.  
ii. Data collection methods 
We sent a web link to 114 AHEPP’s members to request their participation in 
our study and five hospitals responded favorably. We had a rate of participation of 
4.38% of hospitals of size ranging from large to small. AARs were received and de-
identified by the AHEPP before sending them to the research team.  
Although secondary data were used, our design was based on case study 
research design by which data will be systematically collected and coded in order to 
facilitate connection to underlying principles. Based on the request from AHEPP 
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leadership, hospitals will have a period of two weeks to share their improvement 
matrix by e-mail. Data received from hospitals will be redacted and will not contain 
any identifiers. IRB will not be required given this study is preliminary needs 
assessment as being part of a quality improvement project for AHEPP. 
iii. Study data 
The study will involve both real-incidents and emergency response exercises 
reports. The AARs are written in narrative form; thus, the qualitative approach will 
be used to analyze the content of the improvement plan. Twenty-three reports have 
been received and all of them will be included in the study.  
iv. Data analysis  
1. Statistical analysis 
An integration of both top down and bottom-up qualitative analysis method 
were used in our study. Improvement matrix received from hospitals were entered 
into MAXQDA for analysis. MAXQDA version 12 and produced by VERBI GmbH is a 
software program designed for computer-assisted qualitative and mixed methods 
data, text and multimedia analysis in academic, scientific, and business institutions. 
We aimed to perform a content analysis of IPs included in twenty-three AARs. AARs 
were categorized based on types of incidents and the six Joint Commission critical 
areas were used to identify the hospital capabilities that are being tested. IPs’ content 
analysis was performed according to thirty-four critical areas ‘elements of 
performance which were retrieved from the Joint Commission hospital accreditation 
standards.   
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Each Improvement Plan is reviewed and coded, and notes were taken in order 
to categorize the reports into types of incidents. Coded segments were assigned to 
relevant elements of performance which were sub-coded to the critical areas. 
MAXQDA will be used to abstract data based on types of event, capability being 
evaluated, and improvement areas. Descriptive statistics were performed to identify 
the recurrence of the themes and their frequencies were tabulated from each 
elements of performance. The first step of our analysis involved the description of 
differences across types of incidents. Then, we have described variations in 
capabilities and their corresponding elements of performance.  
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4. Results 
Table 1. The Occurrence of Improvement Areas Per Critical Areas and Types of Incident. 
 
Threat Category
Resources and 
Assets
Patient clinical 
and support 
activities
Utilities 
management
Staff
Safety and 
security
Communication Total
Percentage 
(%)
Communication System failure 0 0 0 10 0 8 18                3.8 
Natural disasters 14 12 2 25 18 24 95             19.9 
Child abduction 0 0 0 3 3 6 12                2.5 
Real Event- Road Accident 4 9 0 13 4 4 34                7.1 
Utility Failure 4 2 4 2 5 4 21                4.4 
Facility Evacuation 7 12 2 31 14 24 90             18.8 
Active Shooter 2 0 0 12 14 12 40                8.4 
Hazardous Materials 12 5 2 23 10 13 65             13.6 
Code Bleu: Cardiac or Respiratory arrest 10 2 0 11 1 6 30                6.3 
Code Red: Fire or Smoke 2 3 3 16 20 29 73             15.3 
Total 55 45 13 146 89 130 478
Percentage (%) 11.5                   9.4                      2.7                        30.5                     18.6                    27.2                   
Improvement Areas Occurrences Per Threat Category
 29 
Twenty-three AARs were received from hospitals and all of them were included 
in our study. AARs included in the study had variable volume of information (at least 
one statement) that were sufficient for the content analysis of hospital emergency 
preparedness critical areas. Ten types of incidents were identified based on the 
exercise overview and the real events mentioned in AARs. Of the twenty-three ARRs, 
two focused on the response to communication failure, four focused on response to 
natural disasters, one focused on the response to child abduction, two focused on 
response to utility failure, three focuses on response to facility evacuation, two 
focused on response to active shooters, five focused on response to hazardous 
materials, one focused on response to code blue emergency, two focused on response 
to code red emergency, and one real event road accident. All ARRs involved 
improvement plans that focused on at least one of the six Joint Commission 
accreditation critical areas.  
All six critical areas and their element of performance were coded according to 
the improvement plan of each AAR/IP. The number of occurrences of critical areas is 
shown in table 1. A total number of 478 occurrences of element of performances were 
coded from the twenty-three AARs, with staff (30.5%) and communication (27.2%) 
having the highest element of performance. Utility management (2.7%) had the 
lowest area of improvement as a result of the exercises or real event reports. The 
element of performances per threat categories has shown higher occurrences during 
natural disasters (19.8%) and facility evacuations (18.8%). Lower occurrences were 
observed during code red (15.2%), hazardous materials (13.5%), active shooter 
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(8.3%), road accident (7.1%), code blue (6.2%), utility failure (4.3%), communication 
system failure (3.7%), and child abduction (2.5%) (see details in table 1).  
i. Staff 
Of the twenty-three AARs describing challenges associated with the capability of staff 
responsibilities, we were able to extrapolate one-hundred-forty-six different 
statements. Top three types of incident with improvement areas related to staff 
involved: facility evacuation (21.2%); natural disasters (17.1%); and hazardous 
materials (15.7%). The content analysis was done based on elements of performance 
that were derived from staff capability as shown in table 2. 
 
Table 2: Staff Elements of Performance with some of their corresponding improvement areas 
 
Staff primary and 
cross-trained roles 
and responsibilities 
 
How staff are 
assigned to all 
essential functions 
How the emergency 
operation plan 
describes how to 
identify licensed 
independent 
practitioners, staff, 
and authorized 
volunteers 
How hospital 
identifies individual 
(s) to whom staff 
report in the incident 
command structure 
▪ The Business 
Continuity Plan 
(BCP) was not 
timely received, 
even though 
command 
implemented a 
deadline; 
 
▪ Staff were 
unfamiliar with 
hospital 
incident 
command 
system 
practices, 
incident 
response 
guides, and job 
action sheets; 
 
▪ Some staff were 
not well trained 
on the 
utilization of 
specialized 
medical 
equipment. 
 
▪ Confusion on 
appointing 
roles and what 
exactly that role 
entailed; 
 
▪ There wasn’t 
trained public 
information 
officer available 
is the response 
team; 
 
▪ There was not 
enough staff to 
effectively 
search for the 
missing child. 
▪ The hospital 
needed more 
staff at the 
entrance 
throughout the 
time we were 
diverting 
patients; 
 
▪ Needed 
someone 
designated as 
the family care 
unit leader; 
 
▪ Needed a 
liaison between 
the nursing and 
imaging 
department. 
▪ Staff were not 
clear on 
whether to 
report to the 
Incident 
Command 
Commander or 
not; 
 
▪ Communications 
unit leader 
wasn't sure who 
to call; 
 
▪ some patient 
care sections 
operated 
independently 
of the chief of 
operations. 
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ii. Communication 
Challenges associated with communication have been extrapolated hundred-
thirty times and it was across the ten types of incident. Most communication issues 
were observed during code red emergencies (22.3%), facility evacuations (18.4%), 
and natural disasters (18.4%). Elements of performance from the communication 
capabilities were used to extrapolate areas of improvement from AARs as shown in 
table 3.  
 
 
Table 3: Communication Elements of Performance with some of their corresponding improvement 
areas 
 
How an employee will 
be notified that the 
emergency response 
procedures have been 
initiated. 
How the hospital will 
communicate with the 
patient and their 
families. 
Demonstrate 
successful use of 
internal and external 
radios sending and 
receiving 
transmissions. 
Backup systems for 
communications and 
downtime 
documentation 
procedures 
▪ Not all leaders 
were notified of 
the event; 
 
▪ Staff were 
unable to access 
the hospital 
emergency 
preparedness 
portal for 
corporate 
notification of 
exercise; 
 
▪ Administrators 
On Call (AOC) 
were not 
included in the 
code pink 
emergency 
paging group. 
▪ There was no 
communication 
when a patient 
was dropped off 
in the front 
lobby; 
 
▪ there was lack 
of verbal call 
outs and closed-
loop 
communication, 
and families and 
friends were 
not notified of 
the new 
location that the 
patient was 
relocated to 
within the 
hospital; 
 
▪ The 
communication 
plan did not 
consider 
external 
services 
▪ Radios were 
requested for 
the command 
center but were 
not utilized; 
 
▪ Not all 
information 
went through 
the chain of 
command; 
 
▪ Security and 
plant 
operations were 
not able to 
communicate 
with each other 
because 
security went 
on digital radios 
while plant 
operations still 
using analog 
ones. 
▪ Limited landline 
phones 
available; 
 
▪ Public Switched 
Telephone 
Network 
(PSTN) devices 
were kept in 
cabinets; 
 
▪ Hospital 
electronic 
incident 
command 
system was 
having 
intermittent 
problems. 
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iii. Safety and Security 
Safety and security capabilities were coded with eighty-nine statements that 
involved all AARs. Most safety and security issues were extrapolated from code red 
emergencies (23.4%), natural disasters (20.2%), facility evacuation (15.7%), and 
active shooter (15.7%). The remaining types of incident mentioned few improvement 
areas regarding safety and security. For example, communication system failure 
reported zero improvement area and one segment was extrapolated from code blue 
emergencies. We extrapolated the statements from the AARs and coded them with 
different elements of performance as shown in table 4.  
Table 4: Safety and Security Elements of Performance with some of their corresponding 
improvement areas 
 
 
 
How hospital will 
coordinate security 
activities internally 
and with community 
security agencies. 
How to restrict facility 
access and control 
movement of an 
unauthorized person. 
How the hospital will 
manage hazardous 
materials. 
Demonstrate a chain 
of custody for 
personal belonging. 
▪ Security staff 
were present in 
the command 
center, but not 
utilized 
sufficiently; 
 
▪ There was not 
enough security 
staff to 
effectively 
search for the 
missing child; 
 
▪ Some video 
surveillance 
cameras were 
not working 
during the 
power outages. 
▪ Security staff 
did not have 
proxy badges to 
access certain 
areas of the 
hospital; 
 
▪ Unnecessary 
personnel and 
visitors in close 
proximity to 
scenes; 
 
▪ Not all 
employees were 
wearing their 
identification 
badges. 
▪ Some 
hazardous 
materials spill 
procedures 
were found not 
up to date; 
 
▪ No safety and 
security staff 
were present 
for the drill; 
 
▪ Handling 
hazardous 
materials was 
not performed 
appropriately 
▪ Patient 
evacuation was 
delayed due to 
poor handling 
of their 
personal 
belongings; 
 
▪ Patient care 
devise batteries 
were 
overcharged 
and heated up 
during power 
outage; 
 
▪ Upon initial 
patient 
movement, it 
was unclear as 
to what 
entrance was 
being used by 
the vans to 
transport 
patients. 
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iv. Resources and Assets 
Resources and Assets were coded, and fifty-five statements were extrapolated 
from AARs. Natural disasters (25.4%), hazardous materials (21.8%), and code blue 
(18.1%) had the highest coded segments. Improvement areas were extrapolated 
based on their relation to the elements of performance of the capabilities.  
Table 5: Resources and Assets Elements of Performance with some of their corresponding 
improvement areas 
 
 
 
 
 
How the hospital will 
monitor quantities of 
its resources and 
assets during an 
emergency. 
How hospitals will 
obtain and replenish 
medications. 
How the hospital 
arranges 
transportation of 
patient. 
How to conserve and 
share resources with 
other health care 
organization 
▪ All evacuations 
regardless of 
the department 
generating 
evacuees had to 
go through the 
ICS system as 
they all 
compete for the 
same resources; 
 
▪ Some of the 
inventory forms 
came back 
incomplete; 
 
▪ Patients rooms 
were not ready 
to 
accommodate 
pediatric 
treatments. 
▪ Some hospital's 
departments 
did not have 
medications 
and supplies 
when 
requested; 
 
▪ Having patients 
all the way 
down the hall 
was a struggle 
bringing 
medications 
and supplies 
down to the 
point of 
operations; 
 
▪ Some 
department did 
not have 
pediatric chest 
tubes. 
▪ There was no 
plan for full 
evacuation of 
hospital; 
 
▪ There were not 
enough vehicles 
to evacuate staff 
as not all them 
drive to work; 
 
▪ There was no 
separate 
location 
designated to 
set up 
Emergency 
Management 
Services 
transport, and 
patients who 
were 
discharged. 
▪ Equipment such 
the suction unit 
was non-
functional; 
 
▪ There was not a 
specific EOP for 
dialysis. 
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v. Patient clinical and support activities 
Patient clinical and support activities are one major capability that has been 
extensively evaluated by hospitals and it we have extrapolated statements from AARs 
forty-five times. Segments from AARs involved various types of incidents and the 
highest are as follow: Natural disasters (26.6%), facility evacuations (26.6), and road 
accident (20%). Exercises for active shooter did not mention improvement areas 
related to patient clinical and support activities. Elements of performance related to 
patient clinical and support activities were coded by relevant improvement areas 
segments as shown in table 6.  
 
 
Table 6: Patient clinical and support activities Elements of Performance with some of their 
corresponding improvement areas 
How the hospital will manage 
patient scheduling, triage, 
assessment, and treatment. 
How patient documentation 
and tracking capabilities 
during emergency. 
How hospital demonstrated 
horizontal and vertical patient 
evacuation using equipment, 
routes, and location of staging 
areas. 
▪ No plan was made for 
alternate triage or 
treatment sites; 
 
▪ there was no plan for 
alternative blood courier 
service to provide blood 
to the point of treatment; 
 
▪ There was a delay in 
providing food to the 
patients. 
▪ No use of the disaster kits 
and patient charts; 
 
▪ The tracking forms that 
were available for the 
exercise were not used 
during the event; 
 
▪ There wasn't appropriate 
internal and external 
patient tracking system, 
and there was delay 
accessing patient chart. 
▪ Improvement areas 
involved the fact that not 
all evacuation tags were 
filled out; 
 
▪ The specialty clinic did 
not appropriately use the 
wheelchair stair machine 
to vertically move 
patients; 
 
▪ Staff who were assisting 
in the relocation of 
patients were not made 
aware of any medical 
precautions. 
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vi. Utilities management 
The capability for utility management resulted in thirteen coded segments and 
utility failure (30.7%) had the biggest number of improvement areas. As mentioned 
in table 7, various elements of performance were coded based on improvement areas 
from AARs.  
 
5. Discussion  
AARs are knowledge management tools that can be used to identify, describe, and 
disseminate the insight and experiences gained by individuals and groups during a 
challenging event (Savoia et al., 2012) The analysis of AARs comprises an opportunity 
to identify common and/or recurring systems-level challenges. Recurring themes 
across different types of incidents and across multiple types of systems may present 
a direct mandate for hospitals to address the areas of improvement. The goal is to 
Table 7: Utilities management Elements of Performance with some of their corresponding 
improvement areas 
Availability of water, electricity, and HVAC. 
▪ Gas line rupture was not 
timely addressed; 
 
▪ Fire in kitchen caused by 
electricity was not timely 
addressed; 
 
▪ Loss of power and non-
functional back-up 
generator were not 
properly addressed; 
▪ Multiple medication 
administration machines 
were usable during the 
power outage; 
 
▪ The Complete blood 
count (CBC) machine in 
the laboratory shut down 
due to heat; 
 
▪ Computed Tomography 
(CT) and Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (MRI) 
were unable to be used 
during power outage due 
to heat sensitivity; 
▪ staff were not sure what 
to do with the blood and 
regents during power 
outage; 
 
▪ Dryer that was on fire did 
not have high-
temperature sensors; 
 
▪ Double doors well closed 
and that limited the 
ventilation efforts. 
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create a requirement to test the areas of improvement in exercises to ensure that the 
corrective actions were successful. Therefore, improvement areas should be directly 
addressed by emergency operations planners, and tested through the interactive 
cycle of planning, testing, measuring and improving, as recommended in the FEMA 
guidance for the development of AARs/IPs (Savoia et al., 2012). Our study analyzed 
twenty-three AARs and improvement areas grouped according to the six Joint 
Commission critical areas of emergency response. Most common improvement areas 
were related to staff roles and responsibilities, and communication. We were 
unexpectedly surprised by the fact that staff roles and responsibility was the highest 
capability that needed improvement. Most literatures have mentioned 
communication to be challenging during emergency response as multiple responders 
coordinate their efforts. Therefore, we expected communication capability to involve 
more improvement areas. 
The analysis of results related to staff revealed that most AARs have highlighted 
difficulties related to confusion in roles and responsibilities among various response 
personnel, and staff demonstrating a poor depth of knowledge of individual response 
roles. Ambiguity regarding role and responsibilities, and lack of use of the ICS were 
due to lack of training among responders. At various points of operation, additional 
staff was needed. Additional staff could have been mobilized from the labor pool.   
In terms of how the hospital communicates with staff, patients, and external 
systems, the most frequent issues were related to the ability to process and release 
new information, which was often reported as not timely and not reaching all 
stakeholders. Therefore, we suggested the need to develop pre-approved messages 
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to increase the timely release of information. Communication tracking was a 
challenge during code red, facility evacuations, and natural disasters with cases 
ranging from the redundancy of information to absolute lack of information. During 
the response to natural disasters, code red, and power outage, the damages to 
communication infrastructures such as radio and wireless communications systems 
may be the cause of major communication difficulties. Communication across 
different teams within the same hospital was a major issue due to a lack of clarity 
between routine activities and emergency operations. A recommendation would be 
to train more people to send out messages during emergency events using 
appropriate communication methods. 
Our study has identified a number of common themes of “lessons learned” that we 
were able to retrieve from the AARs collected from hospitals. We believe that the 
common themes identified in our study provide data in support of current emergency 
preparedness and response initiatives. Our goal of the study is to provide substantial 
information on potential issues related to emergency response in hospitals. Instead 
of relying on complex training programs such as the multi-year training and exercise 
program (MYTEP) recommended by the HSEEP, local and state exercise planners can 
take advantage of simple summaries of the most common response challenges that 
have routinely proved to be problematic. Therefore, such data could be used by 
planners when drafting their MYTEP in order to proactively mitigate challenges 
during real events or exercises. 
As recommended by the HSEEP guidelines, some AARs were designed to include 
improvement areas to address the problems they encountered. However, many of the 
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recommendations for improvement were often rather generic and could not be 
converted into concrete corrective actions. For example, one hospital reported the 
need to “create a communication plan” but was unable to describe the requirements 
that the plan would entail. Many other hospitals argued that “the planning section 
needed to fill additional positions to assist with the amount of information that needed 
to be evaluated and processed” leaving ambiguity about which specific additional 
positions were needed. Many improvement areas were lacking specific examples to 
clearly illustrate what went wrong. Further, the lack of a consistent structure in AARs 
creates more challenge in the identification of root causes of problems. Therefore, it 
would be difficult to identify specific problems in order to aggregate the lessons 
learned. 
We suggest that recommendations for improvement provide more detailed 
response challenges, and extensively use root cause analysis methodology to better 
understand the sources of the problems. A hospital should use a consistent and simple 
structure to identify emergency response challenges to its ability to apply lessons 
learned. The HSEEP and the Joint Commission should work together to reinforce the 
use of consistent AARs/IPs template across all hospitals in the US. Further, hospitals 
should be encouraged to test the emergency response capabilities described by the 
Joint Commission accreditation standards to facilitate consistent reporting 
mechanism for all types of incidents. That will avoid confusion regarding the 
competing, conflicting, and evolving federal capabilities lists.  AAR data should be 
used by regulatory services for accountability purposes and to provide feedback to 
hospitals. Government may consider providing financial incentives that encourage 
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meeting certain quality criteria in conducting exercises and producing IPs. Quality 
criteria could involve the use of standard capabilities frameworks, root cause 
analysis, concrete examples to illustrate response challenges, and result testing 
mechanisms to ensure effective implementation.   
We believe that the use of consistent structure and including the definition of 
acronyms in AARs will facilitate the identification of problems that may be common 
to several hospitals. Therefore, urgent needs can be immediately addressed, and 
corrective actions can be proactively included in regional training and exercise 
programs. Emergency preparedness and response planners would have the 
opportunity to access best practice central repositories to facilitate the identification 
of common response challenges. Therefore, hospitals will have greater potential for 
learning from each other, and other healthcare organizations can benefit from IPs that 
were well produced and submitted to the central repositories.  
i. Limitations/Delimitations of the study 
Major limitation of the study is the reluctance of hospital to share information due 
to their fierce competition. A limitation of our study involved the fact that we had 
incomplete information as only the improvement matrices were requested from 
hospitals. Understanding the improvement matrices were challenging as they did not 
contain information regarding the overview of the exercise and the analysis of core 
capabilities. It was noted during the AARs analysis that there was no consistency on 
what was included in each critical area section, on how the critical areas were named 
or defined, or on the improvement areas. Furthermore, it was difficult to understand 
acronyms that were extensively used in the improvement matrices.  Due to staff 
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turnover and the use of independent practitioners or volunteers, AARs should be 
written in the most clear way. We delimitated our study not to compare emergency 
response efforts between hospitals as our focus was more directed towards 
identifying common improvement areas. Also, we did not focus on the format of AARs 
as we did not receive full documents from some hospitals.  
6. Conclusions 
Knowledge management is an important discipline which involves the use of 
various strategies and practices to identify, define and disseminate insights and 
experiences gained over time (Savoia et al., 2012). A platform such as the Lessons 
Learned Information Sharing program and the AHEPP are available resources that 
could be used by hospitals to improve their emergency preparedness and response 
operations. Our systematic analysis of AARs enabled us to identify common 
challenges that have consistently emerged during emergency events or exercises 
related to different types of disasters from a small sample of U.S. hospitals. These 
improvement areas involve issues that should be avoided in future emergency 
responses. Training and educations could focus on common improvement areas in 
order to achieve best value for the use of their resources. We believe that the outcome 
of our study could be a basis for a future widespread data-driven support system for 
identifying key areas of concerns to be mitigated during the emergency response 
planning process. Further, we believe that future exercises could include these 
challenges in their objectives as a mechanism for ensuring that emergency response 
efforts are successful. Future studies could involve larger comparisons of hospitals or 
the evaluation of the implementation of corrective actions within the same 
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organization in order to create a collective learning platform from which the entire 
country can learn from.  
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Annexes 1 
 
Threat Category
Resources and 
Assets
Patient clinical 
and support 
activities
Utilities 
management
Staff
Safety and 
security
Communication Total
Percentage 
(%)
Communication System failure 0 0 0 10 0 8 18                3.8 
Natural disasters 14 12 2 25 18 24 95             19.9 
Child abduction 0 0 0 3 3 6 12                2.5 
Real Event- Road Accident 4 9 0 13 4 4 34                7.1 
Utility Failure 4 2 4 2 5 4 21                4.4 
Facility Evacuation 7 12 2 31 14 24 90             18.8 
Active Shooter 2 0 0 12 14 12 40                8.4 
Hazardous Materials 12 5 2 23 10 13 65             13.6 
Code Bleu: Cardiac or Respiratory arrest 10 2 0 11 1 6 30                6.3 
Code Red: Fire or Smoke 2 3 3 16 20 29 73             15.3 
Total 55 45 13 146 89 130 478
Percentage (%) 11.5                   9.4                      2.7                        30.5                     18.6                    27.2                   
Improvement Areas Occurrences Per Threat Category
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Annexes 2 
 
 
 
Document group Document name Creation date
Number of coded 
segments
Number of memos Author
Code Red: Fire or Smoke Submission 1 Code red: fire or smoke in the hospital 3/25/2019 10:30:47 48 0 AdilyAbdoulaye
Code Bleu: Cardiac or Respiratory arrest
Submission 10 Code blue: cardiac or respiratory 
arrest
3/25/2019 10:30:48 30 0 AdilyAbdoulaye
Communication System faillure Submission 13 Fiber Optic Line Cut 3/25/2019 10:30:49 4 0 AdilyAbdoulaye
Hazardous Materials Submission 15 Hazmat Incident Full Scale Exercise 3/25/2019 10:30:49 17 0 AdilyAbdoulaye
Active Shooter Submission 16 Active Shooter Full Scale Exercise 3/25/2019 10:30:49 24 0 AdilyAbdoulaye
Real Event- Road Accident Submission 18 Real Event Bus accident 3/25/2019 10:30:49 34 0 AdilyAbdoulaye
Natural disasters
Submission 19 Tornado/Hazardous Materials Table 
Top Exercise
3/25/2019 10:30:49 12 0 AdilyAbdoulaye
Child abduction Submission 20 child abduction 3/25/2019 10:30:49 12 0 AdilyAbdoulaye
Utility Faillure Submission 22 power outage 3/25/2019 10:31:29 16 0 AdilyAbdoulaye
Facility Evacuation Submission 23 Evacuation 3/25/2019 10:31:29 4 0 AdilyAbdoulaye
Communication System faillure Submission 3 IT system Faillure 3/15/2019 13:03:41 14 1 AdilyAbdoulaye
Utility Faillure
Submission 5 Utility Failure resulting in RO 
treatment system s
3/15/2019 13:03:41 5 0 AdilyAbdoulaye
Active Shooter Submission 8 Active Shooter 3/25/2019 10:30:47 16 0 AdilyAbdoulaye
Code Red: Fire or Smoke Submission 11 Code red: fire or smoke in the hospital 3/25/2019 10:30:48 25 0 AdilyAbdoulaye
Hazardous Materials Submission 12 Medical gas Leak 3/25/2019 10:30:48 4 0 AdilyAbdoulaye
Natural disasters Submission 14 Simulation Drill 3/25/2019 10:30:49 52 0 AdilyAbdoulaye
Facility Evacuation Submission 17 Evacuation Full-Scale Exercise 3/25/2019 10:30:49 45 0 AdilyAbdoulaye
Facility Evacuation
Submission 2 Facility Evacuation and Closure 
Functional Exercis
3/15/2019 13:03:41 41 0 AdilyAbdoulaye
Hazardous Materials Submission 9 Hazardous Materials exposure 3/25/2019 10:30:48 19 0 AdilyAbdoulaye
Natural disasters Submission 21 earthquakes 3/25/2019 10:30:49 29 0 AdilyAbdoulaye
Natural disasters Submission 6 F5 Tornado 3/15/2019 13:03:41 2 0 AdilyAbdoulaye
Hazardous Materials
Submission 7 Air Quality Incident - Hazardous 
Materials exposur
3/15/2019 13:03:41 6 0 AdilyAbdoulaye
Hazardous Materials
 Submission 4 Airborne threat to the healthcare 
facility
3/15/2019 13:03:41 19 0 AdilyAbdoulaye
Number of Coded Segment Per Document
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